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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Judgment dated January 24, 1991, of the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Washington County, Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, that is the subject of 
this appeal is not within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)0"). A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Appendix 
A (R. 237-238). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
May a Chapter 7 debtor compel performance of a nondebtor under a contract that 
has been rejected pursuant to the provisions of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code? 
The trial court's legal conclusion - that the contract terminated by operation of 
law and may not be enforced against either party - did not resolve any issues of fact and 
may be reviewed by this Court for correctness. Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 
P. 2d 174 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Resolution of this appeal rests upon the Court's interpretation of Section 365 of 
the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §101 et seq.). A copy of Section 365 is attached to this 
brief as Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. H. LeRoy Cobabe ("Cobabe") commenced this action to 
enforce the provisions of an Agreement for Consulting Services. (R. 1-7) Garth Stanger 
and Edward Stanger (the "Stangers") answered the complaint, denying liability under the 
contract and counterclaiming for amounts paid to Cobabe. (R. 9-27). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. Pursuant to a Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated August 31, 1991, Cobabe sought summary judgment on his 
contract claim against the Stangers. (R. 34-35). Pursuant to a motion dated 
September 26, 1991 the Stangers sought summary judgment on the same claim and on 
their counterclaim (R. 107-109). Argument on the cross motions for summary judgment 
was heard by Judge Eves on October 18, 1990. (R. 225). On November 2, 1990 Judge 
Eves entered his Memorandum Decision granting the Stangers' motion for summary 
judgment and denying Cobabe's motion. (R. 226-234). A copy of Judge Eves' 
Memorandum Decision is attached to this brief as Appendix C. Judgment was thereafter 
entered in favor of the Stangers. (R. 237-238). 
Statement of Facts.1 Cobabe filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 
of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah 
on November 1, 1989 (the "Petition Date"). (R. 30, 112). 
!The Stangers object to and otherwise dispute paragraphs 6 through 15 (with the 
exception of Cobabe's admission in paragraph 15 that he received $20,000.00 from the 
Stangers after November 1, 1989) of Cobabe's Statement of Facts. The statements 
contained therein are an attempt by Cobabe to rehash bankruptcy court proceedings that 
have no relationship to the issue on appeal for the following reasons: 1) the legal issue 
of whether rejection of the contract barred Cobabe's efforts to enforce its terms against 
the Stangers was never raised by the parties nor decided by the bankruptcy court; and 
2) the January 5, 1990 order of the bankruptcy court, any related findings of fact or 
conclusions of law and any orders issued subsequent thereto have been vacated and are 
of no further force and effect. (R. 19-27). 
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As of the Petition Date Cobabe and the Stangers were parties to the Agreement 
for Consulting Services dated April 26, 1988 (the "Agreement"). (R. 1-7 and R. 9-27). 
Neither Cobabe nor his bankruptcy trustee assumed the Agreement within sixty days after 
the Petition Date or at any time thereafter. (R. 30, 113 and R. 130, H5). 
The Stangers paid to Cobabe all sums required by the Agreement up to the 
Petition Date. (R. 129). Cobabe has performed no services for the Stangers at any 
time following the Petition Date. (R. 130). 
During the course of Cobabe's bankruptcy case the Stangers paid him $20,000.00 
pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy court. (R. 31, 115). The bankruptcy court order 
was subsequently vacated by stipulation of the parties and is of no further force and 
effect. (R. 22-27 and R. 31, 116). Notwithstanding vacation of the order Cobabe refused 
to return the $20,000.00 to the Stangers. (R. 31, 117). 
Cobabe received a bankruptcy discharge of all his obligations on February 20, 
1990. (R. 124). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cobabe filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case in order to obtain a discharge of his 
liabilities and obligations. Upon filing, a trustee was appointed for Cobabe's bankruptcy 
estate and Cobabe's rights with respect to the Agreement were governed by the 
provisions of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. That statute contains provisions and 
conditions, the fulfillment of which would have allowed Cobabe to obtain the benefit of 
his interest in the Agreement while protecting the interests of the Stangers. Having 
failed to comply with the statutory conditions precedent to assumption and assignment 
of the Agreement, Cobabe may not now attempt to enforce its terms against the 
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Stangers. Additionally, case law addressing the effect of rejection of executory contracts 
supports the lower court's determination that rejection of the Agreement resulted in a 
breach sufficient to bar enforcement of the contract against the Stangers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
COBABE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE BANKRUPTCY STATUTE 
BARS HIS PRESENT ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE 
STANGERS. 
The effect of Cobabe's bankruptcy filing on the Agreement and, consequently, the 
impact of the bankruptcy on Cobabe's ability to enforce the Agreement is determined 
by reference to Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a copy of which is attached to this 
brief as Appendix B. A threshold issue in an analysis of Section 365 is the determina-
tion of whether the Agreement is an executory contract. The parties agree that the 
Agreement is an executory contract within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.2 
2The Senate Report contained in the legislative history of Section 365 states: 
Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are 
executory, it generally includes contracts on which perfor-
mance remains due to some extent on both sides. 
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, 
pp. 5787, 5844, 6303. As recognized by at least one court that applied the definition 
contained in this legislative history: 
This loose, non-specific definition is basically an adoption of 
a definition announced first by Professor Countryman, which 
he stated defining executory contracts as follows: 
[A] contract under which the obligation of both 
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract 
are so far unperformed that the failure of either 
to complete the performance would constitute a 
4 
(Cobabe Brief, p. 10 n. 1). Section 365, dealing with executory contracts, contains the 
exclusive statutory statement of the rights of both the debtor and nondebtor with respect 
to executory contracts. In re Sweetwater, 40 B.R. 733, 742 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). Thus, 
the provisions of Section 365, and judicial decisions interpreting that statute, control the 
question of enforceability of the Agreement following Cobabe's bankruptcy. 
The statute itself provides a clear framework outlining Cobabe's rights and 
obligations with respect to the Agreement. When Cobabe filed his petition for relief 
under Chapter 7 a trustee was appointed to administer his bankruptcy estate.3 Cobabe's 
trustee was empowered to assume or reject any executory contract to which Cobabe was 
a party. Section 365(a). Had Cobabe's trustee acted to assume the Agreement he would 
first have been required to cure any existing default and compensate the Stangers for any 
actual pecuniary loss resulting from such default. Section 365(b)(1). Thus, an attempt 
by Cobabe's trustee to assume the Agreement would have required the trustee to address 
any defaults under the Agreement, including the provision of paragraph 6 of the 
Agreement whereby Cobabe agreed to indemnify the Stangers from any and all tax 
liabilities arising from the sale of the auto dealership. (R. 6, 116). Cobabe's bankruptcy 
trustee made no effort to assume the Agreement. If the trustee in a Chapter 7 case 
does not assume or reject an executory contract within 60 days after the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition, the contract is rejected. Section 365(d)(1). The failure of Cobabe's 
material breach excusing the performance of the 
other. 
In re Learning Publications, Inc., 94 B.R. 763, 764 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). 
311 U.S.C. §701 et seq. Had Cobabe chosen to file a reorganization case under 
Chapter 11 he would have had, as a debtor in possession, all of the rights and duties of 
a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §1106. 
5 
trustee to assume the Agreement resulted in its rejection by operation of law. Once 
rejected, the Agreement can never be assumed. The rejection of the Agreement 
constituted a breach of the Agreement effective immediately before the date of the filing 
of the Chapter 7 petition. Section 365(g)(1). 
Cobabe's present effort to avail himself of the benefits of the Agreement is 
nothing more than an end run on the protections afforded the Stangers under the 
bankruptcy statute. Contrary to his assertions, Cobabe had complete control over the 
course of events in this matter. Initially, it was his choice to file a liquidation 
bankruptcy case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than a reorganization 
case under Chapter 11. Had he decided to file a Chapter 11 case it would have been 
his decision, as the debtor in possession, whether to assume or reject the Agreement. 
Conceivably, Cobabe could have assumed the Agreement for the benefit of his creditors 
after first complying with the default cure provisions of Section 365(b)(1) protecting the 
pecuniary interests of the Stangers. Instead, Cobabe chose to file a Chapter 7 case and 
leave the matter in the hands of an independent trustee. Even then, Cobabe was not 
cut off from a course of action that could have attained his stated objective - realization 
of the benefits of the Agreement. However, Cobabe chose to ignore the provisions of 
Section 365 protecting the interests of the Stangers and instead filed suit to enforce the 
Agreement after receiving his bankruptcy discharge. Allowing Cobabe to obtain a 
discharge of his obligations under the contract, while at the same time permitting him 
to compel the Stangers' performance under that same contract would offend basic 
principals of equity and mutuality of obligation. In re Executive Technology Data Systems, 
79 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1987). 
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Cobabe's argument that personal service contracts pass through Chapter 7 
bankruptcy cases unaffected rests upon some fundamental misconceptions. First, Section 
365(a) permits a trustee to assume or reject any executory contract. Section 365(c) 
simply adds the limitation that a trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract 
for personal services unless the parties to the contract consent. In the Matter of James 
Taylor, 913 F.2d. 102, 106 (3rd Cir. 1990). Thus, Cobabe's trustee could have assumed 
the Agreement (subject to the default cure provisions of Section 365(b)(1)) and assigned 
the contract to Cobabe with the consent of the Stangers. Obviously, a bankruptcy trustee 
would not enter into such a transaction unless there would be a resulting benefit to the 
bankruptcy estate. Such benefit might have come in the form of payments from Cobabe 
to the estate in consideration for assumption and assignment of the Agreement. 
However, Cobabe chose not to induce his trustee to assume the contract with the result 
that the Agreement was automatically rejected and breached pursuant to the statute. 
Personal services contracts therefore differ from other executory contracts only in that 
the consent of the nondebtor is required before the trustee has authority to assume 
them. On the other hand, the trustee's authority to reject extends to all executory 
contracts - including personal services contracts. Taylor, 913 F.2d. at 107. In Taylor the 
3rd Circuit expressly rejected the notion that a bankruptcy trustee lacks power to deal 
with personal service contracts. 
The bankruptcy statute provides a clear framework by which Cobabe could have 
obtained the benefits of the Agreement,. Complying with the statute would have required 
the trustee and Cobabe to protect the interests of the Stangers and obtain their consent 
prior to assumption and assignment. Having failed to comply with the requirements of 
Section 365, Cobabe may not now enforce the Agreement against the Stangers. 
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II. 
UNDER CASE LAW IMPLEMENTING SECTION 365 COBABE MAY NOT 
COMPEL THE STANGERS' PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING REJECTION AND 
BREACH OF THE CONTRACT. 
Cobabe's basic premise is that the federal judiciary is "confused" about the law 
regarding executory contracts. (Cobabe Brief, p. 13). He asserts that the rights of the 
parties to the contract are unaffected following rejection. Rejection, however, does not 
merely free the debtor to enforce the contract at his will. Rather it acts to terminate 
the contract and render it unenforceable by either party. The lower court properly 
declined to accept Cobabe's novel interpretation of Section 365 in the face of extensive 
case law to the contrary. 
Although this Court has never addressed the question presently before it, there 
is other pertinent authority. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals took the opportunity to 
discuss the effect of rejection on executory contracts in In re Pacific Express, Inc., 780 
F. 2d. 1482 (9th Cir. 1986). In response to the creditor's argument on appeal that the 
debtor had failed to assume an executory contract with the creditor, the court stated as 
follows: 
Generally, the bankruptcy court may order the bankrupt's 
estate either to assume or reject any executory contract or 
unexpired lease, subject to its approval. 11 U.S.C. §365(d)(2). 
Assumption assures the continuation in force of the contract 
or lease. However, it requires the trustee or debtor-in-
possession to cure all past defaults and to offer adequate 
assurance of future performance. Rejection allows the 
bankrupt's estate to avoid those requirements and limits the 
non-bankrupt obligee to an unsecured claim for breach of 
contract. After rejection, the performance of the non-
bankrupt obligee is excused. 
780 F. 2d. at 1486. (Emphasis added). 
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By this statement the 9th Circuit confirmed an earlier legal conclusion in the case 
of In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F. 2d. 1339 (9th Cir. 1983). The first portion 
of the court's ruling was unremarkable: failure of the debtor's bankruptcy trustee to 
timely assume executory contracts for the sale of land resulted in rejection of the 
contracts by operation of law. However, the 9th Circuit then went on to rule that the 
breach caused by the automatic rejection relieved the nondebtor parties of their 
obligations under the contracts as of the date of breach. 703 F. 2d. at 1353. Clearly, 
the 9th Circuit does not view the breach resulting from rejection as merely a claims 
mechanism. Rather, the breach of a contract occasioned by the operation of Section 
365(d)(1) and 365(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code results in a termination of the contract 
such that it may not be enforced against the nondebtor party. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion regarding the effect of rejection 
on the rights of the parties. In Waldschmidt vs. Metropolitan Lincoln/Mercury, Inc., 53 
B.R. 589 (Bankr. N.D. Tenn. 1985) the Chapter 7 trustee of an individual debtor failed 
to timely assume the debtor's executory contract whereby the nondebtor party had agreed 
to supply vehicles to the debtor at an attractive price. The court first cited the 
legislative history of Section 365 for the proposition that Section 365(d) was intended to 
prevent parties in contractual relationships with the debtor from being left in doubt 
concerning the status of the contract. 53 B.R. at 590 (citing S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 59 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, pp. 5787, 5845). The court 
then held that after rejection the trustee was barred from enforcing the nondebtor's 
promise to provide vehicles under the contract. Contrary to Cobabe's arguments the 
breach arising from the rejection of the consulting agreement terminated the contract 
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and did not simply trigger the Stangers' right to file a claim in Cobabe's bankruptcy 
case. 
It is also clear that Cobabe may not selectively enforce against the Stangers those 
portions of the consulting agreement that are of benefit to Cobabe. In In re Auto Dealer 
Services, Inc., 65 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1986) the debtor, a warranty service 
agreement provider, filed suit against various auto dealers to enforce a provision of a 
contract that required the dealers to refund to the debtor an advance commission upon 
cancellation of certain service agreements. The court first determined that the service 
and dealer agreements had been rejected pursuant to the provisions of Section 365. 
While noting that the refund provision of the contracts may have been enforceable under 
state law, the court found that the operation of Section 365 required a different result. 
In denying the debtor's attempt to enforce the refund provisions of the contracts, the 
court concluded that rejection of the contracts resulted in a breach sufficient to release 
the nondebtor parties of any liability under the contracts. 65 B.R. at 684. To similar 
effect, the court in In re Silk Plants, etc. Franchise Systems, Inc., 100 B.R. 360 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tenn. 1989) determined that rejection of the subject contract meant termination of 
the entire contract, including nonmonetary provisions regarding the debtor's covenant not 
to compete against the nondebtor party. 
As stated previously, Cobabe's contention that personal service contracts are 
somehow exempt from the operation of Section 365 is supported neither by the statute 
nor interpretive case law. Under Section 365, a trustee may reject (either by direct 
action or by failure to act) all executory contracts - including personal service contracts. 
Taylor, 913 F.2d. at 106. The position of the federal courts with regard to the effect of 
rejection of a personal service contract was made clear in In re Calder, 94 B.R. 200 
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(Bankr. D. Utah 1988). In the course of an opinion discussing the rejection of the 
debtor/attorney's personal service contracts with his clients, Judge John H. Allen of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah stated that "a debtor filing a 
chapter 7 liquidation case automatically severs a personal service contract". 94 B.R. at 
203. Although Judge Allen's statement was, admittedly, not central to his decision in 
Calder, it must be viewed by this Court as a reliable indicator of how the federal 
judiciary views the issue at hand. 
As support for his argument that the lower court erred in concluding that the 
Agreement could not be enforced against the Stangers, Cobabe cites two dated cases 
(both of which are clearly distinguishable from the facts at hand) as well as a scholarly, 
though unpersuasive, law review article. First, Cobabe's reliance on Matter of Garfinkle, 
577 F.2d. 901 (5th Cir. 1978), is misplaced. That case involved a bankruptcy trustee who 
had succeeded to the interests of an individual who was both the lessee and the lessor 
of a piece of real property subject to a 999 year lease. The trustee, appointed under 
Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, sought to reject the lease in order to 
destroy a creditor's security interest. In an effort to prevent this perceived injustice the 
5th Circuit obviously confused the concept of rejection with that of abandonment. 
Garfinkle, 577 F.2d. at 904. The court's conclusion that the debtor/lessee's interest in 
the leasehold was not destroyed upon rejection is in direct contradiction of later cases 
under the Code holding that rejection of nonresidential leases terminates the entire 
lease, including any lien on the leasehold interest. In re Giles Associates, Ltd., 92 B.R. 
695 (Bankr. W.D. Tx. 1988); In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Ha. 1988). 
Next, and upon closer reading,, Cobabe's reliance on the case of In re Knight, 8 
B.R. 925 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) is inappropriate given the fact that the Knight court 
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expressly limited its decision to the context of a residential lease where the debtor is a 
consumer tenant. Knight, 8 B.R. at 929. Notwithstanding this express limitation the 
equitable result reached in Knight has not been followed by other courts. 
Finally, Cobabe acknowledges Professor Michael T. Andrew's law review article 
for its analysis of Section 365 and its conclusion that everyone else who has reviewed the 
issue has misunderstood it. (Cobabe Brief, p. 18). The lower court, while acknowledg-
ing Professor Andrew's thoughtful coverage of the issue, properly declined the interpreta-
tion of the statute urged by Cobabe and instead concluded that the Agreement should 
be viewed as terminated in light of the federal court decisions cited above. In view of 
the fact that no federal court has followed Professor Andrew's approach in the three 
years since publication of his article, the Stangers urge this Court to place primary 
reliance on the statute, and federal decisions interpreting the statute, in deciding the 
issue before it. Such an analysis will compel the conclusion that rejection of the 
Agreement resulted in a breach sufficient to bar enforcement of the contract against the 
Stangers. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower 
court. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 1991. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Bv: (Of3/^^ 
Joel T. Marker 
Attorneys for Garth Stanger and 
Edward Stanger 
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GARTH STANGER AND EDWARD STANGER to the following: 
Carolyn Montgomery 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for H. LeRoy Cobabe 
One Utah Center 
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DEPUTr 'p/^.fffrr^ 1 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H. LeROY COBABE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GARTH STANGER and 
EDWARD STANGER, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 90-0503248 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to this Court's Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January ^ ^ , 1991, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff H. LeRoy Cobabe's Complaint, dated April 20, 1990, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice; and 
Ci^  2 . D e f e n d a n t s Garth Stanger and Edward Stanger are hereby granted judgment 
•MJ, \' against H. LeRoy Cobabe, pursuant to their Counterclaim, in the amount of $20,000.00, v
 r 
together with prejudgment interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per year 
from May 25, 1990 to the date of this Judgment, each party to bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees in this proceeding. 
DATED this ^f^flay of January, 1991. 
BY THE COURT 
J^Phillip'Eves, 




Title 11 CASE ADMINISTRATION § 365 
Subsection (d) grants the court the authori-
ty to authorize the obtaining of credit and the 
incurring of debt with a superiority, that is a 
lien on encumbered property that is senior or 
equal to the existing lien on the property. 
The court may authorize such a super-priority 
only if the trustee is otherwise unable to ob-
tain credit, and if there is adequate protection 
of the original lien holder's interest. Again, 
the trustee has the burden of proof on the 
issue of adequate protection. 
Subsection (e) provides the same protection 
for credit extenders pending an appeal of an 
authorization to incur debt as is provided un-
der section 363(/) for purchasers: the credit is 
not affected on appeal by reversal of the au-
thorization and the incurring of the debt were 
stayed pending appeal. The protection runs 
to a good faith lender, whether or not he knew 
of the pendency of the appeal. 
A claim arising as a result of lending or 
borrowing under this section will be a priority 
claim, as defined in proposed section 507(aXl), 
even if the claim is granted a super-priority 
over administrative expenses and is to be paid 
in advance of other first priority claims. 
Legislative Statements. Section 364(f) of 
the House amendment is new. This provision 
continues the exemption found in section 3(a) 
(7) of the Securities Act of 1933 [section 77c(a) 
(7) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade] for certif-
icates of indebtedness issued by a trustee in 
bankruptcy. The exemption applies to any 
debt security issued under section 364 of title 
11. The section does not intend to change 
present law which exempts such securities 
from the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. 
77aaa, et seq. (1976) [section 77aaa et seq. of 
Title 15]. 
References in Text. Section 5 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, referred to in subsec. (f), 
is classified to section 77e of Title 15, Com-
merce and Trade. 
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, referred to 
in subsec. (f), is Title III of Act May 27, 1933, 
c. 38, as added Aug. 3, 1939, c. 411, 43 Stat. 
1149, which is classified to section 77aaa et 
seq. of Title 15. 
Effective Date of 1986 Amendments; 
Savings Provisions; Quarterly Fees. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 99-554 effective 30 
days after Oct. 27, 1986, except as otherwise 
provided for, see section 302(a) of Pub.L. 99-
554, set out as a note under section 581 of 
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
Amendments by Pub.L. 99-554, § 257(/), not 
to apply with respect to cases commenced 
under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before 30 days 
after Oct. 27,1986, see section 302(cXD of Pub. 
L. 99-554, set out as a note under section 581 
of Title 28. 
Cross References 
Applicability of subsecs. (c) to (f) of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 901. 
Priorities, see section 507. 
Reversal on appeal of finding of jurisdiction as affecting validity of debt incurred, see 
section 921. 
Rights and powers of debtor engaged in business, see section 1304. 
Library References: 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy §§ 200-202. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy e=»3035-3038. 
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§ 3 6 5 . Executory contracts and unexpired leases 
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections 
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may 
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 
(bXD If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease 
of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the 
time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee— 
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly 
cure, such default; 
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will 
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or 
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lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such 
default; and 
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such con-
tract or lease. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a 
breach of a provision relating to— 
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time 
before the closing of the case; 
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or 
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under 
this title or a custodian before such commencement. 
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and paragraph (2)(B) 
of subsection (f), adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real 
property in a shopping center includes adequate assurance— 
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such lease, 
and in the case of an assignment, that the financial condition and operating 
performance of the proposed assignee and its guarantors, if any, shall be 
similar to the financial condition and operating performance of the debtor 
and its guarantors, if any, as of the time the debtor became the lessee under 
the lease; 
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline 
substantially; 
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all the 
provisions thereof, including (but not limited to) provisions such as a radius, 
location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will not breach any such provision 
contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement 
relating to such shopping center; and 
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt any 
tenant mix or balance in such shopping center. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if there has been a 
default in an unexpired lease of the debtor, other than a default of a kind 
specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the trustee may not require a lessor 
to provide services or supplies incidental to such lease before assumption of such 
lease unless the lessor is compensated under the terms of such lease for any 
services and supplies provided under such lease before assumption of such lease. 
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or 
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if— 
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such 
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering perform-
ance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession whether 
or not such contract, or lease, prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or 
delegation of duties; and 
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; or 
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt 
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or 
to issue a security of the debtor; or 
(3) such lease is of nonresidential real property and has been terminat-
ed under applicable nonbankruptcy law prior to the order for relief. 
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(d)(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume o:r 
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of 
personal property of the debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or 
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, 
fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected 
(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the trustee may 
assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real 
property or of personal property of the debtor at any time before the confirma-
tion of a plan but the court, on the request of any party to such contract or lease, 
may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether to 
assume or reject such contract or lease 
(3) The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except 
those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief 
under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is 
assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(bXD of this title. The court 
may extend, for cause, the time for performance of any such obligation that 
arises within 60 days after the date of the order for relief, but the time for 
performance shall not be extended beyond such 60-day period. This subsection 
shall not be deemed to affect the trustee's obligations under the provisions of 
subsection (b) or (f) of this section. Acceptance of any such performance does not 
constitute waiver or 'relinquishment of the lessor's rights under such lease or 
under this title. 
(4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (I) and (2), in a case undei airy chapter of 
this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of 
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days 
after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, 
for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, 
and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to 
the lessor. 
(e)(1) Notwithstanding « ^icwsiw*. .. ...,. ^ . i . r a u or unexpired 
lease, or in applicable law, an executory o-< ~ ^ or unexpired lease of the debtor 
may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such 
contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the 
commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease 
that is conditioned on 
(A) t he inso 1 vency or tmanciJ 1 11d 111o11 11I 11 u i1n I H 111 11 111 < Lime 
before the closing of the case; 
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or 
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under 
this title or a custodian before such commencement. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract 
or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits 
or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if— 
(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such 
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering perform-
ance to the trustee or to an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or 
"- '• •-, \ contract or lease prohibits • restricts assignment of .ights or 
«* -tei.;: \ . of d u t i e s , an A 
" " ^ ' — • t; oi 
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(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt 
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or 
to issue a security of the debtor. 
(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a 
provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in 
applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such 
contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph 
(2) of this subsection. 
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor only if— 
(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the 
provisions of this section; and 
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such 
contract or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a default in such 
contract or lease. 
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease 
of the debtor, or in applicable law that terminates or modifies, or permits a party 
other than the debtor to terminate or modify, such contract or lease or a right or 
obligation under such contract or lease on account of an assignment of such 
contract or lease, such contract, lease, right, or obligation may not be terminated 
or modified under such provision because of the assumption or assignment of 
such contract or lease by the trustee. 
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the 
rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a 
breach of such contract or lease— 
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or 
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, immedi-
ately before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
(2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under this section or 
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title— 
(A) if before such rejection the case has not been converted under 
section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, at the time of such rejection; or 
(B) if before such rejection the case has been converted under 
section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title— 
(i) immediately before the date of such conversion, if such 
contract or lease was assumed before such conversion; or 
(ii) at the time of such rejection, if such contract or lease was 
assumed after such conversion. 
(hXD If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor 
under which the debtor is the lessor, or a timeshare interest under a timeshare 
plan under which the debtor is the timeshare interest seller, the lessee or 
timeshare interest purchaser under such lease or timeshare plan may treat such 
lease or timeshare plan as terminated by such rejection, where the disaffirmance 
by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the lessee or timeshare 
interest purchaser to treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by virtue 
of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or other agreements the lessee 
or timeshare interest purchaser has made with other parties; or, in the alterna-
tive, the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser may remain in possession of the 
leasehold or timeshare interest under any lease or timeshare plan the term of 
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which has commenced for the balance of such term and for any renewal or 
extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee or timeshare interest 
purchaser under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
(2) If such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser remains in possession as 
provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, such lessee or timeshare interest 
purchaser may offset against the rent reserved under such lease or moneys due 
for such timeshare interest for the balance of the term after the date of the 
rejection of such lease or timeshare interest, and any such renewal or extension 
thereof, any damages occurring after such date caused by the nonperformance of 
any obligation of the debtor under such lease or timeshare plan after such date, 
but such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser does not have any rights against 
the estate on account of any damages arising after such date from such rejection, 
other than such offset. 
(i)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of 
real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan, 
under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such 
contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such 
real property or timeshare interest. 
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession— 
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such 
contract, but may, offset against such payments any damages occurring after 
the date of the rejection of such contract caused by the nonperformance of 
any obligation. of the debtor after such date, but such purchaser does not 
have any rights against the estate on account of amy damages arising after 
such date from such rejection, other than such offset; and 
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with 
the provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to 
perform under such contract. 
(j) A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under 
subsection (i) of this section, or a party whose executory contract to purchase 
real property from the debtor is rejected and under which such party is not in 
possession, has a lien on the interest of the debtor in such property for the 
recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such purchaser or party has 
paid. 
(k) Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a contract or lease assumed 
under this section relieves the trustee and the estate from any liability for any 
breach of such contract or lease occurring after such assignment. 
(/) If an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessee is assigned 
pursuant to this section, the lessor of the property may require a deposit or other 
security for the performance of the debtor's obligations under the lease substan-
tially the same as would have been required by the landlord upon the initial 
leasing to a similar tenant. 
(m) For purposes of this section 365 and sections 541(b)(2) and 362(b)(10), 
leases of real property shall include any rental agreement to use real property. 
(n)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a 
licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may 
elect— 
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such 
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the 
licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms, 
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applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee with 
another entity; or 
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity 
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under such 
contract and under any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such 
intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intellectual proper-
ty to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights 
existed immediately before the case commenced, for— 
(i) the duration of such contract; and 
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the 
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B) 
of this subsection, under such contract— 
(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights; 
(B) the licensee shall make all royalty payments due under such con-
tract for the duration of such contract and for any period described in 
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends such 
contract; and 
(C) the licensee shall be deemed to waive— 
(i) any right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract 
under this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law; and 
(ii) any claim allowable under section 503(b) of this title arising 
from the performance of such contract. 
(3) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B) 
of this subsection, then on the written request of the licensee the trustee shall— 
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supple-
mentary to such contract, provide to the licensee any intellectual property 
(including such embodiment) held by the trustee; and 
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such 
contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellec-
tual property (including such embodiment) including any right to obtain 
such intellectual property (or such embodiment) from another entity. 
(4) Unless and until the trustee rejects such contract, on the written request 
of the licensee the trustee shall— 
(A) to the extent provided in such contract or any agreement supple-
mentary to such contract— 
(i) perform such contract; or 
(ii) provide to the licensee such intellectual property (including any 
embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by 
applicable nonbankruptcy law) held by the trustee; and 
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such 
contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellec-
tual property (including such embodiment), including any right to obtain 
such intellectual property (or such embodiment) from another entity. 
(o) In a case under chapter 11 of this title, the trustee shall be deemed to 
have assumed (consistent with the debtor's other obligations under section 507), 
and shall immediately cure any deficit under, any commitment by the debtor to 
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, 
the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency, 
or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or its predecessors or 
successors, to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution, and any 
claim for a subsequent breach of the obligations thereunder shall be entitled to 
priority under section 507. This subsection shall not extend any commitment 
that would otherwise be terminated by any act of such an agency. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2574; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, §§ 362, 402-
404, July 10,1984, 98 Stat. 361, 367; Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, §§ 2570*), (m), 283(e), 
Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3117; Pub.L. 100-506, § 1(b), Oct. 18, 1988, 102 
Stat. 2538; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXV, § 2522(c), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4866. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senate Report No. 95-989. Subsection (a) of 
this section authorizes the trustee, subject to 
the court's approval, to assume or reject an 
executory contract or unexpired lease. 
Though there is no precise definition of what 
contracts are executory, it generally includes 
contracts on which performance remains due 
to some extent on both sides. A note is not 
usually an executory contract if the only per-
formance that remains is repayment. Per-
formance on one side of the contract would 
have been completed and the contract is no 
longer executory. 
Because of the volatile nature of the com-
modities markets and the special provisions 
governing commodity broker liquidations in 
subchapter IV of chapter 7, the provisions 
governing distribution in section 765(a) will 
govern if any conflict between those provi-
sions and the provisions of this section arise. 
Subsections (b), (c) and (d) provide limita-
tions on the trustee's powers. Subsection (b) 
requires the trustee to cure any default in the 
contract or lease and to provide adequate as-
surance of future performance if there has 
been a default, before he may assume. This 
provision does not apply to defaults under ipso 
facto or bankruptcy clauses, which is a signifi-
cant departure from present law. 
Subsection (b)(3) permits termination of 
leases entered into prior to the effective date 
of this title in liquidation cases if certain 
other conditions are met. 
Subsection (bX4) prohibits the trustee's as-
sumption of an executory contract requiring 
the other party to make a loan or deliver 
equipment to or to issue a security of the 
debtor. The purpose of this subsection is to 
make it clear that a party to a transaction 
which is based upon the financial strength of 
a debtor should not be required to extend new 
credit to the debtor whether in the form of 
loans, lease financing, or the purchase or dis-
count of notes. 
Subsection (bX5) provides that in lease situa-
tions common to shopping centers, protections 
must be provided for the lessor if the trustee 
assumes the lease, including protection 
against decline in percentage rents, breach of 
agreements with other tenants, and preserva-
tion of the tenant mix. Protection for tenant 
mix will not be required in the office building 
situation. 
Subsection (c) prohibits the trustee from as-
suming or assigning a contract or lease if 
applicable nonbankruptcy law excuses the 
other party from performance to someone oth-
er than the debtor, unless the other party 
consents. This prohibition applies only in the 
situation in which applicable law excuses the 
other party from performance independent of 
any restrictive language in the contract or 
lease itself. 
Subsection (d) places time limits on assump-
tion and rejection. In a liquidation case, the 
trustee must assume within 60 days (or within 
an additional 60 days, if the court, for cause, 
extends the time). If not assumed, the con-
tract or lease is deemed rejected. In a reha-
bilitation case, the time limit is not fixed in 
the bill. However, if the other party to the 
contract or lease requests the court to fix a 
time, the court may specify a time within 
which the trustee must act. This provision 
will prevent parties in contractual or lease 
relationships with the debtor from being left 
in doubt concerning their status vis-a-vis the 
estate. 
Subsection (e) invalidates ipso facto or bank-
ruptcy clauses. These clauses, protected un-
der present law, automatically terminate the 
contract or lease, or permit the other con-
tracting party to terminate the contract or 
lease, in the event of bankruptcy. This fre-
quently hampers rehabilitation efforts. If the 
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trustee may assume or assign the contract 
under the limitations imposed by the remain-
der of the section, the contract or lease may 
be utilized to assist in the debtor's rehabilita-
tion or liquidation. 
The unenforcibility of ipso facto or bank-
ruptcy clauses proposed under this section will 
require the courts to be sensitive to the rights 
of the nondebtor party to executory contracts 
and unexpired leases. If the trustee is to 
assume a contract or lease, the court will have 
to insure that the trustee's performance under 
the contract or lease gives the other con-
tracting party the full benefit of his bargain. 
This subsection does not limit the applica-
tion of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause if a 
new insolvency or receivership occurs after 
the bankruptcy case is closed. That is, the 
clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely 
made inapplicable during the case for the 
purposes of disposition of the executory con-
tract or unexpired lease. 
Subsection (f) partially invalidates restric-
tions on assignment of contracts or leases by 
the trustee to a third party. The subsection 
imposes two restrictions on the trustee: he 
must first assume the contract or lease, sub-
ject to all the restrictions on assumption 
found in the section, and adequate assurance 
of future performance must be provided to the 
other contracting party. Paragraph (3) of the 
subsection invalidates contractual provisions 
that permit termination or modification in the 
event of an assignment, as contrary to the 
policy of this subsection. 
Subsection (g) defines the time as of which a 
rejection of an executory contract or 
unexpired lease constitutes a breach of the 
contract or lease. Generally, the breach is as 
of the date immediately preceding the date of 
the petition. The purpose is to treat rejection 
claims as prepetition claims. The remainder 
of the subsection specifies different times for 
cases that are converted from one chapter to 
another. The provisions of this subsection are 
not a substantive authorization to breach or 
reject an assumed contract. Rather, they pre-
scribe the rules for the allowance of claims in 
case an assumed contract is breached, or if a 
case under chapter 11 in which a contract has 
been assumed is converted to a case under 
chapter 7 in which the contract is rejected. 
Subsection (h) protects real property lessees 
of the debtor if the trustee rejects an 
unexpired lease under which the debtor is the 
lessor (or sublessor). The subsection permits 
the lessee to remain in possession of the 
leased property or to treat the lease as termi-
nated by the rejection. The balance of the 
term of the lease referred to in paragraph (1) 
will include any renewal terms that are en-
forceable by the tenant, but not renewal terms 
if the landlord had an option to terminate. 
Thus, the tenant will not be deprived of his 
estate for the term for which he bargained. If 
the lessee remains in possession, he may offset 
the rent reserved under the lease against 
damages caused by the rejection, but does not 
have any affirmative rights against the estate 
for any damages after the rejection that result 
from the rejection. 
Subsection (i) gives a purchaser of real prop-
erty under a land installment sales contract 
similar protection. The purchaser, if the con-
tract is rejected, may remain in possession or 
may treat the contract as terminated. If the 
purchaser remains in possession, he is re-
quired to continue to make the payments due, 
but may offset damages that occur after rejec-
tion. The trustee is required to deliver title, 
but is relieved of all other obligations to per-
form. 
A purchaser that treats the contract as ter-
minated is granted a lien on the property to 
the extent of the purchase price paid. A 
party with a contract to purchase land from 
the debtor has a lien on the property to secure 
the price already paid, if the contract is re-
jected and the purchaser is not yet in posses-
sion. 
Subsection (k) relieves the trustee and the 
estate of liability for a breach of an assigned 
contract or lease that occurs after the assign-
ment. 
Legislative Statements. Section 365(b)(3) 
represents a compromise between H.R. 8200 
as passed by the House and the Senate amend-
ment. The provision adopts standards con-
tained in section 365(b)(5) of the Senate 
amendment to define adequate assurance of 
future performance of a lease of real property 
in a shopping center. 
Section 365(bX4) of the House amendment 
indicates that after default the trustee may 
not require a lessor to supply services or 
materials without assumption unless the les-
sor is compensated as provided in the lease. 
Section 365<cX2) and (3) likewise represent a 
compromise between H.R. 8200 as passed by 
the House and the Senate amendment. Sec-
tion 365XcX2) is derived from section 365(bX4) 
of the Senate amendment but does not apply 
to a contract to deliver equipment as provided 
in the Senate amendment. As contained in 
the House amendment, the provision prohibits 
a trustee or debtor in possession from assum-
ing or assigning an executory contract of the 
debtor to make a loan, or extend other debt 
Title 11 CASE ADMINISTRATION § 365 
financing or financial accommodations, to or 
for the benefit of the debtor, or the issuance of 
a security of the debtor. 
Section 365(e) is a refinement of comparable 
provisions contained in the House bill and 
Senate amendment. Sections 365(eXD and (2) 
(A) restate section 365(e) of H.R. 8200 as 
passed by the House. Sections 365(eX2XB) ex-
pands the section to permit termination of an 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor if such contract is a contract to make a 
loan, or extend other debt financing or finan-
cial accommodations, to or for the benefit of 
the debtor, or for the issuance of a security of 
the debtor. 
Characterization of contracts to make a 
loan, or extend other debt financing or finan-
cial accommodations, is limited to the exten-
sion of cash or a line of credit and is not 
intended to embrace ordinary leases or con-
tracts to provide goods or services with pay-
ments to be made over time. 
Section 365(0 is derived from H.R. 8200 as 
passed by the House. Deletion of language in 
section 365(fX3) of the Senate amendment is 
done as a matter of style. Restrictions with 
respect to assignment of an executory contract 
or unexpired lease are superfluous since the 
debtor may assign an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor only if such 
contract is first assumed under section 364(f) 
(2XA) of the House amendment. 
Section 363(h) of the House amendment rep-
resents a modification of section 365(h) of the 
Senate amendment. The House amendment 
makes clear that in the case of a bankrupt 
lessor, a lessee may remain in possession for 
the balance of the term of a lease and any 
renewal or extension of the term only to the 
extent that such renewal or extension may be 
Cross References 
Allowance of claims, see section 502. 
Applicability of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 901. 
Assumption or rejection of certain executory contracts within reasonable time after 
order for relief, see section 744. 
Collective bargaining agreements, see section 1167. 
Effect of rejection of lease of railroad line, see section 1169. 
Impairment of claims or interests by plans which cure certain defaults, see section 
1124. 
Provisions in plan for assumption or rejection of certain executory contracts or 
unexpired leases, see sections 1123 and 1322. 
Right of possession of party with security interest as affected by default 
Aircraft equipment and vessels, see section 1110. 
Rolling stock equipment, see section 1168. 
Setoff, see section 553. 
Library References: 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy §§ 108, 117, 216-230. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy <5»3101 et seq. 
obtained by the lessee without the permission 
of the landlord or some third party under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law. 
Codification. Amendment to subsec. (cXD 
(A) by Pub.L. 99-554, § 283(eXlX/), struck out 
"or an assignee" as the probable intent of 
Congress, notwithstanding language of amend-
ment requiring "or and assignee" be struck 
out. 
Effective Date of 1988 Amendments; Ap-
plication of Amendments. Amendment by 
Pub.L. 100-506 effective Oct. 18,1988. and not 
applicable to cases commenced before Oct. 18, 
1988, see section 2 of Pub.L. 100-506, set out 
as a note under section 101 of this title. 
Effective Date of 1986 Amendments; 
Savings Provisions; Quarterly Fees. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 99-554 effective 30 
days after Oct. 27, 1986, except as otherwise 
provided for, see section 302(a) of Pub.L. 99-
554, set out as a note under section 581 of 
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
Amendments by Pub.L. 99-554, § 2570'), 
(m), not to apply with respect to cases com-
menced under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before 30 
days after Oct. 27, 1986, see section 302(cXD of 
Pub.L. 99-554, set out as a note under section 
581 of Title 28. 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See 
section 553 of Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, July 10, 
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date 
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1 
of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions. For separa-
bility of provisions of Title III of Pub.L. 98-
353, see section 551 of Pub.L. 98-353 set out as 
a Separability of Provisions note preceding 
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
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IN THE DISTPICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H. LeROY CCBABE, 
vs. 
GARTH STANGER and 
EDWARD STANGER, 
Plaintiff, 1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 Civil No. 900503248 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on October 18, 1990, 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, en cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiffs were represented by Carolyn 
Montgomery, their attorney of record and the Defendants by Joel T. 
Marker, their attorney of record. The Court heard extensive oral 
argument and then took the matter under submission. The Court has 
now reviewed the file in its entirety including the article 
entitled Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy? Understanding 
"Re jection,f, by Michael T. Andrew which was submitted by Plaintiff 
and the copies of statutes and cases cited in opposition to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by counsel for 
the defense. The Court being fully advised in the premises now 
enters the following Decision and Order. 
This case places this Court in a rather unusual position 
of being required to decide a hotly disputed issue of Federal 
Bankruptcy Law which is really the only legal issue presented by 
either side in their Motions for Summary Judgment. A brief 
explanation of the facts would appear appropriate. These are the 
fa'cts to which the parties have agreed there is no dispute. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
On or about April 26th, 1988, the parties entered into 
an agreement for consulting services, (the agreement), wherein the 
Plaintiff agreed to act as consultant for the Defendants who were 
purchasing a Toyota dealership from the Plaintiff. The agreement 
contained provisions for compensation to the Plaintiff from the 
Defendants. Both sides kept up their obligations under the 
agreement through the month of October, 1989. On November 1, 
1989, the Plaintiff filed bankruptcy in response to a Writ of 
Garnishment which was served on the Defendants by a prevailing 
party in another lawsuit with the Plaintiff therein seeking to 
garnish the payments due from these Defendants to this Plaintiff. 
Thereafter, these Defendants refused to make any more payments 
under the agreement with this Plaintiff and the matter wound up 
before the Federal Bankruptcy Court on a Motion to determine the 
validity of the garnishment. 
After hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the 
garnishment had no validity as it was attempting to garnish 
post-petition earnings. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the 
Defendants to pay to this Plaintiff some $20,000.00 in overdue 
payments under the agreement or to be found in contempt of court 
wicn stated penalties. A payment of $20,300.00 was made to 
Plaintiff by Defendants under that order. 
Thereafter, on stipulation of both sides, the Order of 
the Bankruptcy Court was vacated and the enforcement of the 
consulting agreement between this Plaintiff and these Defendants 
became the subject of a Complaint before this Court on April 23, 
1990. The Plaintifffs Complaint states simply that there is an 
agreement between himself and the Defendants, that he is entitled 
to payment under that agreement, that the Defendants have failed 
and refused to pay as required under the agreement. The Plaintiff 
seeks Judgment for the amounts due under the agreement. To that 
Complaint the Defendants have filed an Answer and asserted a 
Counterclaim. The issue raised by the Answer and Counterclaim is 
the issue which this Court must resolve in this decision, mainly 
whether or not the agreement between the parties has any further 
force or effect between these Darties. 
The parties agree for purposes of this decision that the 
agreement is in fact an executory contract within the meaning of 
the bankruptcy laws, that is was not assumed within 60 days of the 
petition date by the trustee in bankruptcy, that by operation of 
law the nonassumption meant that the contract had teen rejected by 
the trustee in bankruptcy, and that the Bankruptcy Court did not 
rule on the issue of the effect of that rejection upon the rights 
and obligations of these parties to the contract, under 11 U.S.C., 
Section 365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
LEGAL ISSUE 
The issue upon which the resolution of these Motions for 
Summary Judgment turns is the effect of the rejection of the 
executory contract by the trustee in bankruptcy. Plaintiff 
contends that such a rejection is merely a decision by the 
bankruptcy trustee not to include the executory contract as an 
asset (with a corresponding liability) in the estate of the 
bankrupt. Plaintiff contends further that the effect of the 
rejection by the trustee is simply to leave the parties in the 
position they were in prior to the rejection and thus seeks to 
enforce the agreement. Plaintiff contends he remains ready, 
willing and able to perform consulting services and has never 
breached the agreement. Defendants contend that the rejection by 
the trustee in bankruptcy has the effect, as a natter of law, of 
terminating their obligations to perform under the contract. 
Defendants cite 11 U.S.C. Section 365 for the proposition that the 
rejection by the trustee constitutes a breach of the contract and 
ends their obligations and rights thereunder except their right to 
file a claim for damages with the trustee. They assert therefore 
in their Answer and Counterclaim that the contract is of no 
further force and effect and Plaintiff has no right to pursue. 
payments under the agreement. 
ANALYSIS 
In support of Plaintiff's position counsel has referred 
the Court to several cases and to the article by Michael T. Andrew 
referred to above. None of the cases appear dispositive of the 
issue as it is apparent by the cases cited by the parties as well 
as the cases cited by Mr. Andrew in his article that there is a 
longstanding dispute among the Federal Judges as to the exact 
effect of a rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in 
bankruptcy. Mr. Andrew, and the Plaintiff, contend the Federal 
Courts has erred in their interpretation of 11 U.S.C, 365. There 
are cases cited by both sides which appear to support their 
respective positions to some extent. None of the cases cited 
appear to be factually similar to this case. (See In Re Knight, 8 
B.R. 925 [1981] and In Re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2nd 
1339 [1983]). 
The Court is substantially persuaded by the article by 
Mr. Andrew cited hereinabove that the doctrine of rejection of an 
executory contract by a trustee did not originally include the 
concept that the debtor and the non-debtor party to the contract 
would have their rights and liabilities thereunder automatically 
terminated by the rejection. The Court is further substantially 
persuaded that it was not the original intent to the Courts 
involved in the development of the concept of rejection that the 
statutory breach language contained in the present bankruptcy code 
would somehow operate to terminate those rights and liabilities. 
In fact, the arguments and policy considerations stated by Mr. 
Andrew appear to make perfect sense to this Court. However, this 
Court is obligated to apply Federal Bankruptcy Law as it has been 
interpreted by the Federal Courts to the best of its ability 
rather than to apply a novel interpretation of that law in this 
case. This does not appear to be a case of first impression and 
therefore this Court must follow Federal decisions. 
In two cases the Federal Courts have apparently held 
that rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in bankruptcy 
has the effect of terminating the liabilities under the contract . 
excusing any further performance by the non-debtor party. 
(See In Re Cochise College Park , Inc., 703 F.2nd 1339, 1353 [9th 
Circuit 1983] and In Re Pacific Express, Inc., 780 F.2nd 1482, 
1486, footnote 3 [9th Circuit 1986]). In addition, several 
Federal decisions have held that similar language relating to 
leasehold interests means that the lease is terminated if the 
lease is rejected by the bankruptcy trustee. These latter 
authorities are less persuasive on the issue before this Court in 
view of the additional language contained in that statute which 
seems to provide that if the rejection occurs the debtor must 
immediately return possession of the property to the landlord. 
(See 11 U.S.C. Section 365 (d)(4).) 
It is apparent to this Court in analyzing the 
authorities that although Mr. Andrew may have a superior 
intellectual position as demonstrated by his article, the Federal 
Courts have not followed his logic in applying the statute and 
have indeed followed the rule that rejection by the trustee 
results in a termination of all future rights and liabilities both 
of the debtor and of the non-debtor in an executory contract. 
This Court feels constrained to follow that authority. 
It is hereby Ordered therefore that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of the Defendants is GRANTED and the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff is DENIED. Counsel for the 
Defendants is to prepare and submit Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and an appropriate Judgment for the Court's consideration 
and signature. 
The Court hereby certifies this decision under U.F.C.P. 
54(b) as final for the purpose of allowing appropriate appellate 
review. Counsel for the Defendants is to include this 
certification in the documents submitted in accordance herewith. 
DATED this ^ ~~ day of ~ ^ ^ £ * * * ^ ^ w , 1990. 
IILIP EVES 
District ^ Court Judge 
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